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Interstate Consolidation: A Comparison of the ALl Project
with the Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act
Edward H. Cooper*

I. INTRODUCTION

The Uniform Transfer of Litigation Act (UTLA) was undertaken for
purposes simpler than the mass consolidation of multiparty, multiforum litigation.
It seeks to create an effective tool that can be used to reduce some of the
artificial barriers that tradition has erected around the sovereign separateness of
the many different court systems in this country. The fact of separate sovereignty must be recognized, however, and to this end consent of both transferring and
receiving courts is required. Within the consent requirement, transfer from the
court system of one sovereign to the court system of another can improve on
present practices in many settings. A court that lacks subject matter or personal
jurisdiction can transfer rather than dismiss. An inconvenient court can transfer
to a convenient court rather than invoke forum non conveniens or perhaps
struggle on with the litigation. Should complementing federal legislation be
enacted, transfer can work better than dismissal when supplemental jurisdiction
is declined, or when a state court concludes that a dispute lies in exclusive
federal jurisdiction. Of course an effective structure must address the incidental
questions that arise when one sovereign's court system transfers jurisdiction, in
whole or in part, to another sovereign's court system. Good answers to these
questions are important. Clear answers are even more important. The answers
given by the UTLA will be described below.
These simpler purposes, however, did not obscure the opportunities for
effecting consolidation of related litigation brought in different court systems.
The structural problems are the same, and the effective answers are the same in
dealing with many ordinary situations. A contract dispute between a Michigan
seller and an Ohio buyer, for example, could give rise to closely related actions
in Michigan and Ohio courts. Transfer for consolidation may serve the interests
of both court systems and at least one of the parties. Beyond these ordinary
situations, transfer also may provide an effective answer for more complex
situations involving large numbers of related lawsuits. These situations too were
considered. The succinct statement of reasons for transfer in Section 104,
indeed, includes "the public interest in securing a single litigation and disposition
of related matters." The comment states that this factor "establishes a starting
point for consolidation in state court systems of multiparty, multiforum disputes."
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The American Law Institute Complex Litigation Project was well under way
when the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
Committee began drafting work on the UTLA. The ALl Project had identified
the problems that must be surmounted in consolidating large numbers of
dispersed lawsuits and had outlined tentative answers. The UTLA Committee
deliberately chose to put aside the complex problems that arise in designing a
system that asks states to consent in advance to a system that, without specific
later consent, can wrest litigation from the courts of an unwilling state and thrust
it into the courts of another unwilling state. Any system that has this capacity
must be built with great care and no small measure of prophetic vision. The ALl
model, sketched in Section 4.02 and fleshed out in the Reporter's Study, seeks
to address the central concerns. An Interstate Complex Litigation Panel (ICLP)
would be established, composed of one judge from each participating state. The
ICLP would have power to direct transfer and consolidation of state court actions
without consent of the transferring or receiving courts. Standards for transfer
and consolidation are set. Procedures are developed for making transfer and
consolidation decisions, for review of those decisions, and for review of some
decisions by the transferee court. The managerial powers of the transferee court
are defined. Personal jurisdiction and choice-of-law problems are addressed.
The UTLA model is much simpler than the complex ALI model. It also

may seem less threatening. Transfer requires consent of both transferring and
receiving courts. No state need, against its will, send its litigants elsewhere. Nor
must any state, against its will, assume the burden of litigation brought
elsewhere. Each state is assured that the transfer determination is made by
courts intimately familiar with all of the details of each individual case and with
the procedural and systemic advantages of litigation in each system..
The UTLA model, albeit more modest, is intended to serve the same
purposes as the ALI model in dealing with multiple parallel actions. It would
be difficult to quarrel with the general standard set out in Section l(a)(2) of the
Reporter's Study, authorizing transfer and consolidation to promote "the just,
efficient, and fair conduct of the actions" when consolidation "is superior to their
separate adjudication." Although there is no central authority that can give
guidance, significant consolidation remains possible. Often there will be a
natural focus for potential consolidation. Common disasters provide the most
obvious examples: an airplane crashes, a hotel bums, a structure collapses.
Usually there is a defined geographic location for the event, and usually much
of the related litigation will be filed in the local courts. There is an obvious
receiving court for litigation filed in other states. The receiving court, moreover,
may be willing to undertake the burden of added cases-particularly if
consolidation does not entail responsibility for trying individual caisation and
damage issues-because the added burden is not great, and consolidation helps
the court to achieve a single, consistent resolution of common issues under a
single choice of law. Significant measures of consolidation may be accomplished under this model, and the experience may support creation of more
ambitious programs in the future.
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The common disaster example illustrates a deeper problem. Common
disaster litigation arising from a single discrete event may represent the outer
limits of consolidated adjudication through adversary procedure. Even with
hundreds of plaintiffs and several defendants and insurers, several characteristics
make effective disposition possible. There is a well-defined occurrence. Most
of those injured, if not quite all, can be identified. Resolution of common
liability issues often can pave the way for manageable disposition of individual
issues, ordinarily by settlement. The challenges presented by widespread injuries
dispersed in time and place are much more daunting. Asbestos litigation is
simply the most aggravated and familiar example of many product and process
liability problems. Most of these problems are not fit for disposition under
current substantive doctrines of tort, contract, or property law. Even if these
doctrines were intrinsically satisfactory, adversary judicial procedure is not. It
has proved difficult to develop plausible means to resolve common liability
issues promptly and effectively against defendants. It will prove far more
difficult to develop plausible means of resolution in favor of defendants. Beyond
that point, we have found no means of achieving any measure of rationally
comparable treatment of individual issues. Our model insists on individual
assessments of exposure, causation, and damages. Common disposition, whether
the labels are those of class actions or consolidation of nominally individual
actions, cannot provide individual control of common liability determinations and
cannot provide individual consideration and disposition of individual issues.
Individual claimants are participants--often quite remote participants-in the
processing, not the adjudication, of their disputes. The ALI model is one for the
relatively short-term future, and perforce assumes the continuation of present
procedures. The present procedural capacities of any court system, state or
federal, provide a weak and sinking foundation for the imposing structure needed
to effect massive consolidation.
One fundamental contrast between the ALl project and the UTLA model,
then, is that the UTLA does not make any wholesale assumptions about the
adequacy of adversary judicial procedure to resolve truly massive consolidated
litigation. Consolidation will occur only when both the several transferring
courts and the receiving court make independent judgments that the resulting
package is within the institutional and procedural capacities of the receiving
court.
More detailed contrasts remain. There also are detailed similarities. The
following sections will explore several of the comparisons that address the
choice-of-law incidents of transfer.

11. CHOICE OF MERITS LAW
The ALl Project proposes a sophisticated and elegant set of choice-of-law
rules for consolidated proceedings. Such rules, generalized to other settings, may

provide the way out of the contemporary choice-of-law morass. That question
is well ventilated in other articles in this Symposium.

Such rules also will
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stimulate vigorous debate and disagreement, as well demonstrated by these
articles. The UTLA deliberately refrained from answering these questions. This
reticence was due in part to the different setting. The UTLA addresses the full
range of noncriminal litigation. A choice-of-law code for the UTLA would have
to reach many more questions than are addressed by the ALI Project. Another
reason for reticence may be that it will prove easier to reach agreement on
relatively fixed rules for the truly mammoth consolidations addressed by the ALI
proposal. It is difficult to avoid deep dissatisfaction with the present system.
Hundreds or thousands of people may be injured in the same way by a common
course of conduct followed by a single defendant or group of defendants. Their
claims may be determined by bodies of law that frequently vary in subtle but
important detail and that at times vary in more fundamental ways. It is difficult
to understand why some should be well compensated, others less well compensated, and still others denied any compensation. The sheer absurdity of the
situation may force grudging surrender to rules that dim this sorry spectacle.
There is less obvious pressure to regularize choice-of-law practice in smallerscale disputes. Desirable transfers might often be thwarted if transfer required
both transferring and receiving courts to surrender to a dictated choice of law.
Rather than a set of rules, choice-of-law concerns are addressed by the
UTLA in an open-ended way. The approach is largely controlled by a central
feature of the UTLA structure. Transfer carries control of the litigation to the
receiving court. Divided authority is obviously unworkable. There must not be
any opportunity for the parties to play one court off against the other, nor any
fear that a transfer may come undone if the transferring court is displeased with
the receiving court's actions. The transferring court cannot even impose binding
conditions on the receiving court. Instead, Section 105 allows it to state "terms"
of transfer; Section 208 permits the receiving court to depart from these terms
for good cause.
Beyond the problem of divided control lies the prospect that proceedings in
the receiving court may develop new information that affects any earlier
disposition that might have been made by the transferring court. The affiliating
circumstances that inform a choice of law may not be fully developed at the time
of transfer.
Within this structure, choice-of-law considerations can be addressed in
several ways. The first occasion will be the motion to transfer. The transferring
court should consider the likely choice of law in determining whether to transfer.
A conclusion that forum law should apply is likely to defeat transfer entirely, or
to limit transfer to defined purposes such as consolidated discovery. A
conclusion that a particular law should be applied, whether that of the transferring court or some other jurisdiction, can be expressed as a term of transfer. The
receiving court likewise should consider the likely choice of law. Choice of its
own law would provide a strong reason for accepting transfer. If a particular
choice is stated as a term of transfer, the receiving court should accept transfer.
only if that term is likely to prove acceptable: Once transfer is accepted,
however, the receiving court must be free to reconsider the choice of law as the
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case develops. An eventual determination that the case should be controlled by
the law of the transferring court may justify transfer back under Section 217, but
the disruption of repeated transfers weighs against transfer back unless the
content of the controlling law is significantly uncertain.
III.

PERSONAL JURISDICTION

Recognition of personal jurisdiction is tightly bound up with the choice-of-law
process. An exercise of jurisdiction inevitably imposes the court itself as forum,
a choice that may be more important than any other. The forum administers
whatever choice-of-law rules may be followed, whether imposed from outside as
suggested by Section 9 of the ALl Reporter's Study or followed in the free will of
the forum. Once the law is chosen, it is interpreted and applied by the forum.
The UTLA and the Complex Litigation Project reflect substantially similar
views of the impact of interstate transfer and consolidation on personal jurisdiction.
Consolidation of related actions in asingle court may justify assertion of personal
jurisdiction over an action and over parties that could not be reached if the forum
sought to reach that action as adetached unit. This conclusion is influenced by the
prospect that consolidation often will reduce the burdens borne by individual
parties. It is more heavily influenced, however, by the public advantages that flow
from consolidation. Consistent outcomes are perhaps more important in this regard
than the savings of judicial resources.
The means used by the UTLA to implement this expansive view ofjurisdiction
is the open-ended long-arm provision of Section 203. If the transferring court has
subject matter and personal jurisdiction, it can transfer to a court that could not
independently command personal jurisdiction under its ordinary domestic rules.
No attempt is made to enact a phrase that might capture the constitutional
constraints that will limit this jurisdiction.
Application of Section 203 can be illustrated by a simple illustration,
elaborated from the notes to Section 8,comment f of the ALl Reporter's Study. A
Rhode Island plaintiff is injured in aRhode Island accident involving an automobile
she purchased from a Rhode Island dealer and had serviced by a Rhode Island
mechanic. She brings suit in Rhode Island against the manufacturer, the dealer, and
the mechanic. Consolidated litigation involving the same model automobile is
pending in one of two state courts-a Massachusetts court sitting in Boston or a
California court sitting in San Francisco. Transfer of the entire Rhode Island
litigation to Massachusetts may be appropriate. Transfer of the claim against the
manufacturer to California may impose untoward burdens on the plaintiff even
apart from assimilation of her personal claim into the mass proceeding. Transfer'
of the claim against the dealer, whose only connection with California may be
selling automobiles made by a manufacturer who also sells automobiles to dealers
in California, may be even more obviously untoward. Transfer of the claim against
the mechanic may be beyond reasonable contemplation.
The UTLA addresses the risks of improvident transfer by the structure of the
transfer process. Transfer requires an order of the transferring court, which can
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undertake a case-specific inquiry into the burdens imposed by transfer. The
transferring court also can make an informed appraisal of the costs of continuing
with the action and an intelligent guess as to the benefits of transfer and consolidation. It is required by Section 104 to consider the interest of each plaintiff in
selecting the forum. A decision to transfer part or all of an action provides an
impressive assurance of probable fairness. Transfer also requires an order of the
receiving court, which reconsiders the same factors as the transferring court from
the vantage of its own familiarity with the proceedings, whether the receiving court
is at the threshold of possible consolidation or already has consolidated a number
of other cases. This double scrutiny should support jurisdiction in many circumstances that would not support a unilateral assertion ofjurisdiction by a single court
acting in stand-alone litigation. It also may provide greater assurances of fairness
than the decisions of a centralized panel, such as the Interstate Complex Litigation
Panel (ICLP) envisioned by the Reporter's Study.
The UTLA reaches an additional circumstance that occasionally may prove
useful in dealing with large-scale consolidation. Section 103 permits a court that
lacks personal jurisdiction to transfer to a court that has personal jurisdiction.
Ordinarily this provision will be invoked in ordinary litigation, both when the
plaintiff has overreached as to all defendants and when it is desirable to split the
action by transferring rather than dismissing as to some defendants. The same need
may arise, however, if a court holding consolidated proceedings concludes that it
lacks personal jurisdiction as to some claims involving some parties.
IV. LIMITATIONS

The only explicit choice-of-law provision in the UTLA is found in the
limitations provisions of Section 209. Section 209 prohibits the receiving court
from dismissing "because of a statute of limitations a claim that would not be
dismissed on that ground by the transferring court." This provision does not carry
with the case all of the limitations doctrines of the transferring court. A court that
would apply its own shorter limitations period as a matter of "procedure," for
example, can transfer to a court that would apply a longer period. Because under
Section 210 transfer takes the filing date in the transferring court to the receiving
court, the result may be that transfer preserves a claim that would be barred as
untimely if a new action must be filed in the receiving court.
The ALl Project sets out a somewhat similar limitations rule in Section 6.04.
Section 6.04 invokes the limitations law of the state whose law is chosen to govern
mass tort or mass contract claims. But it adds an exception that if that law would
bar a claim that was timely where filed, the claim will be remanded to the transferor
court. Apparently, remand is designed to discourage forum shopping by denying
the benefits of consolidation to plaintiffs who delay filing beyond the period
allowed by the law chosen to govern the claim.
It is a fair question whether either provision is quite right. For present
purposes, the important question is whether plaintiffs should continue to enjoy the
power that comes from the willingness of many courts to treat limitations as a
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procedural matter, automatically referred to the law of the forum. Under the
UTLA, a court that has been chosen only for its longer limitations period may feel
bound to apply its own period only because it feels caught in this traditional rule.
It might prefer to transfer to a more convenient court for an independent determination of the limitations law that should govern the claim. That option is foreclosed
by Section 209. If transfer is otherwise desirable, however, at least it remains
possible to conduct the litigation in the court best situated to overcome the
problems arising from delayed filing. Under the ALl approach, the case must be
shuttled back to a court that may have no interest in the dispute beyond the power
of general personal jurisdiction and the laxity of traditional limitations choice rules.
V.

APPEALS

Allocation of appeal jurisdiction is one of the most difficult problems incident
to transfer. The greatest difficulties arise with respect to rulings made before
transfer and the transfer determination itself. Appeal of these rulings in the
ordinary course, before transfer can be accomplished, could delay transfer so long
as to defeat its purposes. Orders made after transfer also can cause complications,
particularly if consolidated disposition of some matters is followed by dispersion
for further proceedings based on the consolidated disposition.
Section 7 of the ALI Reporter's Study addresses four variations of the appeals
problems. First come transfer determinations of a subpanel of the ICLP. Arefusal
to transfer is not reviewable. An order granting transfer is reviewable only by a
review panel of the ICLP. Second is the transferee court's plan and order for
disposition of the consolidated litigation, determining which issues are to be
resolved in the consolidated proceedings. This plan and order also are reviewable
only by the ICLP, and review is available only as a matter of discretion. Thus, a
state trial court is reviewed not by any court in that state, or any other state, but by.
a panel of an interstate entity that may not include any judge from the same state.
Third is a final determination of liability. Review may be had in the courts of the
consolidation state in two circumstances. If there is a separate adjudication and
final determination of liability as to all the claims and parties, review must be
sought immediately. If review is sought by a defendant, the appellate court may
grant review if that is likely to avoid harm to the party seeking review and to
promote efficient and economical resolution of the litigation. If there is a final
judgment as to less than all of the claims or parties, appeal may be sought if the
same criteria are met and in addition the trial court certifies that there is no just

reason for delay. Finally, the transferee state appellate courts entertain all appeals
from any court that has decided any issue in a case in which liability was
determined by the transferee court.
The ALI appeals structure ensures control in a single court. The advantages

are apparent. The consolidated determination of liability would have to be appealed
in the transferee state before remand for determination of individual issues in other
courts, no matter how undesirable that might be, if courts in other states heard
appeals from orders made after the consolidated proceedings. The only alternatives
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would be no review of the liability determination, review in the courts of several
states, or divided appeals of liability in the transferee state and other issues in other
states following conclusion of each separate subsequent proceeding. Single-court
control also protects against evasion of the liability determination by indirect
means. The disadvantages also are apparent. The appellate courts of the transferee
state must review the decisions of courts in other states, applying the unfamiliar
procedural law of other states, supervising discretionary determinations, and at
times considering both choice-of-law determinations and the application of
unfamiliar substantive principles. And accommodations must somehow be made
for differences in the occasions for appeal and the standards of review. The
proposed appeal structure may make the best possible compromise between the
competing horrors, but it shows the complications entailed by the ambitious ALl
structure.
The UTLA appeal system also is complicated. An order granting or refusing
transfer can be reviewed only in the transferring state, and only by extraordinary
writ or comparable interlocutory appeal procedures. No review can be had in the
transferring state of orders made before transfer and not reviewed before transfer
takes effect. An order accepting or refusing to accept transfer likewise can be
reviewed only in the receiving state, and only by extraordinary writ or comparable
interlocutory appeal procedure. The courts of the receiving state review all other
orders according to their own appeal procedures, including orders made by the
transferring court before transfer that were not reviewed in the transferring state
before the transfer took effect. This provision for review of orders made by acourt
in adifferent state is not as drastic as the ALl provision. There are not likely to be
many pretransfer rulings that require review on appeal from a final judgment,
particularly since transfer is likely to be made relatively early in most proceedings.
If the transferring court prefers to accomplish review within its own system, it can
deny transfer or stay the transfer order pending appeal of any orders that can be
appealed under local procedure. If the receiving court sends proceedings back to
the transferring court, either by return or transfer back, the transferring court system
resumes appeal jurisdiction as to unreviewed pretransfer orders and orders made
after the return or transfer back. The same result follows on transfer to a third state,
which takes over the appeal authority of a receiving state.
The UTLA appeal system works in conjunction with the basic double-consent
structure to reduce the occasions for review by courts in one system of orders made
by courts of a different state. Quite different systems could be imagined and indeed
were considered. The final resolution, however, once again seems simpler than the
ALl model.
VI. PROCEDURAL LAW ACCOMMODATIONS

The tradition that the forum adheres to its own procedure may make it
surprising to discover the UTLA provisions that effectively govern choice of
procedural law. Nonetheless, there are at least three provisions that deserve
comment.
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Sections 107 and 211 integrate proceedings in the transferring and receiving
courts with respect to matters completed before transfer and matters pending at the
time of transfer. Completed proceedings have the same effect as in the transferring
court unless the receiving court orders otherwise. Pending proceedings are to be
completed according to the rules of the transferring court unless either the
transferring court or the receiving court orders otherwise. Discovery proceedings
are agood illustration of these provisions. Different states may differ with respect
to such matters as the frequency of discovery, the occasions for granting and
modifying protective orders, the admissibility of discovery information at trial, and
the scope of work product protection. The potential disruptions occasioned by
transfer are reduced if completed proceedings continue to have the consequences
they had in the transferring court. Even as to pending proceedings, particularly
outstanding interrogatories, requests to produce, or requests for admissions, it is
likely to be more orderly to rely on the procedural law that applied when the
requests were framed. These presumptions, however, are subject to the overriding
determination that the receiving court must have control over all proceedings after
transfer. The receiving court is particularly apt to exercise this control in
proceedings that consolidate multiple actions from several states.
Section 212 accomplishes asimilar result with respect to orders in effect at the
time of transfer. Transfer does not interfere with the continuing effect of any order,
but the receiving court may vacate any order of the transferring court as if it were
its own. Here too, the model of dominating control in the receiving court requires
definitive power to act under the law of the receiving state.
Finally, the optional provisions of Section 213 adopt the choice-of-law rules
of the transferring court to govern two sets of issues affecting counsel. The law that
would be applied by the transferring court governs contracts between clients and
counsel who appeared in the transferring court and any ground advanced to
disqualify counsel who appeared in the transferring court. These provisions are
designed to address the special problems that might arise from disruption of
established attorney-client relationships. The special sensitivity of these matters,
however, led to treating this provision as an optional part of the Act. Other matters
affecting attorney-client relationships were left untouched, including rules of
privilege, confidential communications, and conflicts of interest.
These procedural provisions underscore the basic proposition that transfer
between courts in different systems is a complicated undertaking, even in simple
two-party actions. The adjustments that must be made when asingle court receives
actions transferred from several different systems are all the more complex. It
seems helpful, however, to provide such guidance as can be managed so that the
consequences of transfer can be understood and weighed in the process of deciding
whether to transfer or receive.
VII. CONCLUSION
This brief comparison is designed to demonstrate the difficulty of the task
undertaken by the ALl model. The UTLA system is not simple. Many of the
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potential difficulties of transfer are reduced, however, by the basic structure. Much
can be accomplished by requiring the conjoint consent of transferring and receiving
courts and by requiring that controlling authority be surrendered to the receiving
court.
The UTLA model does not provide a means for effecting consolidation as
complete as can be accomplished by the ALI model. Potential transferring courts
often will deny transfer. Transfer to several different receiving courts may be more
likely than with the ALl model. Choice-of-law determinations are left to the
unguided judgment of the receiving court, which may find it difficult to rise beyond
the severe limits of all present choice-of-law models to respond to the just needs for
coherent and consistent adjustment of interests affected by a common course of
events.
The urge to press beyond the limits of the UTLA model, however, may
properly be tempered by contemplating the difficulties that arise from any model
that seeks to compel more thorough-going consolidation. Any system that asks
both sending and receiving states to surrender the transfer decision to an interstate
tribunal must provide persuasive answers to many troubling questions. The most
troubling question is whether any court anywhere, state or federal, has the capacity
to administer mammoth consolidated proceedings. The ambitious ALl model does
not attempt to offer any new answers to this question. Perhaps the next most
troubling question is whether an interstate consolidation tribunal can be expected
to focus as clearly as need be on the specific fairness concerns that attend transfer
as to each party to each related action. Transfer determinations by each court
entertaining a related action inevitably will lead to fewer transfers and less
consolidation; it is far from clear whether that is a bad thing. Among the other
troubling questions, the difficulties of defining appeal jurisdiction stand out.
Massive consolidation of common liability questions often would not be possible
without subsequent dispersion of individual questions of causation and damages.
There is no good answer to the ensuing questions of appeal jurisdiction. If the ALl
study has proposed the least bad answer, it remains fair to weigh the ensuing costs
in the cumulating balance of difficulties entailed by a centralized system for
coercive consolidation.
These doubts do not amount to a demonstration that the ALI model is illadvised. It provides a comprehensive study of the problems that must be
encountered in any system for widespread consolidation of related litigation
pending in different state court systems. The answers proposed often are ingenious.
Some variations of many of these answers may be essential components of any
workable system. Only a centralized tribunal, for example, can ensure widespread
consolidation, and only a centralized tribunal can develop a sustained tradition and
common-law rules. For the present, however, it may be wiser to work for general
adoption of the UTLA and development of the experience it can provide with
intersystem transfer. There still is something to be said for sturdy simplicity in the
face of ingenious complexity.

